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Abstract There are two basic positions where tolerance as political strategy and moral
viewpoint is rejected or made redundant. We are hostile to tolerance when we hold that
we are defending an objective truth—religious or secular—which should also be
defended and maintained by means of political and legal power. And tolerance become
superfluous also when the affirmation of plurality becomes total, and tolerance identical
to a vive la difference. As recent developments in my own country—the Netherlands—
have demonstrated, the political outcome of this last position is remarkably enough not
necessarily an all-inclusive relativistic tolerance. It may just as well be one of intoler-
ance towards ‘believers’ of all kinds, in short: tolerance becomes polemical and
belligerent. Turning to religious fundamentalism or ultra-orthodoxy could then become
a possible (extreme) reaction to this relativistic and subjectivist position, as demon-
strated in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s novel The Penitent. Between these two positions of
hostility or indifference towards tolerance, we can situate that democratic attitude
which may rightly be called ‘tolerance’. As ethical position, the tolerant citizen accepts
the democratic disjunction between my (private) truth and the symmetrical justice
between citizens. As political strategy, a tolerant democratic regime is based upon a
political act of exclusion of what I will here call ‘political fundamentalism’.
Keywords (In)tolerance . Difference . Truth . Political and existential fundamentalism .
Hypocrisy . Subjectivism . Exclusion
‘I won’t have much to say about the arrangements that get ruled out entirely—the
monolithic or totalitarian political regimes’, the American political philosopher Michael
Walzer informs us in the Introduction to his On Toleration (1997). This narrowing of
his theme has not remained unchallenged. If Walzer is only interested in regimes and
discourses already becharmed by tolerance, his compatriot Stanley Fish wonders, is
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there still a problem? Should not tolerance as political strategy and moral viewpoint be
proof against precisely the troublesome cases, ‘those forms of thought indifferent or
hostile to the tolerance that is his subject?’ (Fish 1999)
‘Toleration makes difference possible’, says Walzer, ‘and difference makes tolera-
tion necessary’. 1 There are indeed two basic positions where tolerance as political
strategy and moral viewpoint is rejected or made redundant. We are hostile to tolerance
when we hold that we are defending an objective truth—possibly even still to be
partially realized in historical-philosophical terms—which should also be defended and
maintained officially, by means of political power. What Walzer calls ‘difference’ in
this instance represents a denial or deviation from objective truth, or an obstacle to
historic necessity. Whoever denies this truth ought to be punished as ‘dissident’, re-
educated, or should merely be tolerated in the way we temporarily tolerate irregularities
until the i‘s are crossed and the t’s are dotted again.
We nowadays tend to associate ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘theocracy’ with religious
regimes. Yet much of the twentieth century saw a grim confrontation with another
monolithic truth-regime, the scientistic or rationalistic one of ‘concrete socialism’. Also
here a truth was elevated to the throne of power, and not only were those who refused to
profess this truth (‘dissidents’) imprisoned or exiled, the regime also exacted a price of
ubiquitous hypocrisy.2 Here intolerance is not the result of an eruption of the irrational
such as is often associated with religious fanaticism and militant devotion, but precisely
of the ‘illusion of the omnipotence of reason’ (Finkielkraut 1995), of assuming that the
method and rigour of the natural sciences could simply be transposed to the domains of
the social and political. In short, removing the religious foundation from a society
apparently does not suffice. And hypocrisy was already the by-product of those
societies which at the beginning of the modern era continued the strive towards
religious homogeneity. (I) In conclusion to my essay I will show that the establishment
of a truth-regime has continued to remain a temptation to modern democracies
confronted by an increasing social and cultural diversity.
However, tolerance become superfluous or even taboo not only when difference is
regarded as an inadmissible denial of the truth, but also when the affirmation of
plurality becomes total, and tolerance identical to a vive la difference! Also when all
moral and religious truths become ‘subjective’, like luxuries in which one may or may
not choose to invest, does tolerance lose its object and meaning. As recent develop-
ments in my own country—the Netherlands—have demonstrated, the political outcome
of this is remarkably enough not necessarily an all-inclusive relativistic tolerance. It
may just as well be one of intolerance towards ‘believers’ of all kinds, that is, anyone
unable to hold tolerance itself as the highest good. Tolerance then becomes polemical
and belligerent. (II)
Turning to religious fundamentalism or ultra-orthodoxy could then become a pos-
sible (extreme) reaction to this relativistic and subjectivistic position, as demonstrated
in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s The Penitent, a novel which traces the moral-psychological
logic of a conversion to ultra-orthodox Judaism. (III)
Between these two positions of hostility or indifference towards tolerance, we are
eventually able to situate that democratic attitude which may rightly be called
1 Walzer, o.c., XII.
2 See de Wit (2010)
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‘tolerance’. As ethical position, the tolerant citizen accepts the unavoidable ‘narcissistic
wounding’ given with democracy’s disjunction between my (private) truth and the
symmetrical justice between citizens, the equa libertas of Ancient Rome. As political
strategy, a tolerant democratic regime is based upon a political deed of exclusion of
what I will here call ‘political fundamentalism’—in distinction to ‘existential funda-
mentalism’, which in no way needs to be at odds with democratic tolerance. (IV)
I ‘Thinking One Thing and Saying Something Else’: Hypocrisy as Modern
Problem
Even if freedom of opinion could be suppressed, wrote Spinoza in the famous final
chapter of his Theological-Political Treatise in the context of Amsterdam of more than
three centuries ago, then it will certainly never happen that the people ‘think only what
the authorities want, and thus it would necessary follow that man would be continually
thinking one thing and saying something else. This would undermine the trust which is
the first essential of a state; detestable flattery and deceit would flourish, giving rise to
intrigues and destroying every kind of honest behaviour (de Spinoza 2008).’ The price
of a religious state-truth is therefore the ‘doubling’ of truth.
One of his predecessors, the great seventeenth century theorist Thomas Hobbes,
indeed had accepted a difference between public ‘confession’ (a minimal religious truth
decided and prescript by the state) and ‘faith’ (the inner conviction of the citizen).
Spinoza’s hope was that by permitting explicitly what was unavoidable anyway (that
people think and judge the way they want) the state could benefit under the provision of
the freedom of judgment, because the best ideas could flourish. His example was
Amsterdam, the city ‘which enjoys the fruits of this liberty, with its great growth being
the admiration of all nations’.3
But in his study on Hobbes, the twentieth-century political thinker Carl Schmitt
makes another evaluation of the dynamic inherent to the freedom of religion and
judgement. He points out the moment where the ‘decisionism’ of the Hobbesian
absolute monarchy becomes an object of ridicule, and thereby already loses its theo-
logical legitimacy. For example, in his Leviathan Hobbes wrestled with the then-
important problem of the miracle, in other words, the immediate intervention of God
in the natural realm. Whether a given event constitutes a miracle, remains for the
sovereign to decide, says Hobbes, but, in his heart of hearts the citizen remains free to
believe in the miracle or not: after all, thinking is free (Hobbes 1651). ‘Here nothing is
true, here all is command’, comments Schmitt, and he quotes from a French satirical
poem in which the ultimate consequence of assigning this competence to the monarch
is drawn. When the monarch determines what constitutes a miracle, the other side of the
coin is that the miracles stop at the state’s behest. The monarch, vicarious Dei, is here
elevated above God, for as Saint-Médard says in his poem ‘de par le Roi defense à
Dieu, de faire miracle en ce lieu’ (Schmitt 1938). Here the moment of ridiculousness in
Hobbes’ model of state comes to the fore—in our time, not dissimilar to Saddam
Hussein’s laughable declaration to the Iraqi people that Iraq had in fact won the 1991
3 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 257.
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Gulf War. Here all is political decision and command, inclusive the truth, which now
finds itself ‘on the other side’ of the regime.
Thus, according to Schmitt, already at the time of Hobbes and Spinoza the criticism
of hypocrisy and a merely external expression of allegiance to political power implied a
certain religious primacy of the inner over the outer, of personal fides over official
confessio, of piety and vericitas over the divine rights of the state. Divine right becomes
merely the decor of a state which in reality has become a legality machine. Yes, says
Schmitt, ‘whoever in general concerns himself with the distinction between inner and
outer, has thereby already recognized the ultimate superiority of the inner over the
outer, the invisible over the visible, the quiet over the noisy, the hereafter over the here.’
4 Guaranteeing peace has become the state’s highest purpose in the modern era, but in
this it can only succeed if its citizens refrain from opposing it with their own (religious)
truths; the separation of fides and confessio is therefore also a political necessity.
Genealogically speaking, here one may situate the birth of religious subjectivism and
the trivializing of religion, of which more in a moment.
II The Triumph of Subjectivism as Suspension of Tolerance
We can now take the giant step from the one extreme of what Paul Ricoeur has termed
the ‘tolerance curve’—the minimal tolerance of the absolute monarchy, its obsoles-
cence even in the totalitarian state—to the other extreme: an attitude which he
summarizes as ‘vive la différence’.5 On the basis of his definition of tolerance (‘the
fruit of an ascetism in the exercise of power’) Ricoeur distinguished five stages in his
curve from minimal to maximal tolerance. In the first stage, I endure against my will
that which I disapprove, forced by a third party arbitrator. Ricoeur’s example here is the
Edict of Nantes, where two Christian confessions were forced to cohabitate. In the
second stage I disapprove your manner of thinking, but at the same time I ‘make an
effort to understand the manner of thinking, acting and living, finally a conception of
good other than our very own.’6 The French philosopher is talking here about a schism
or a ‘rift’ that has its seat in the individual—as an example he refers to individuals or
small communities following an Erasmus, a Mélanchton, or a Leibniz. The determining
stage in Ricoeur’s curve is the acceptance of pluralism in stage three, where I no longer
tolerate the other on the basis of what I consider truth, but on the basis of the
recognition of the equal right of the other to lead the life he wants to, the equa libertas
in other words. In this case, my attitude is still ‘judgemental’ (as in Michael Sandel’s
‘Judgemental Toleration’),7 but I accept practices I morally reject because of the higher
good of shared citizenship and civic peace. This dissociation of truth and justice enables
4 Schmitt, o.c. 95.
5 Paul Ricoeur, ‘L’usure de la tolérance et la résistance de l’intolerable’, in: Diogène no. 176, oct.-dec. 1996,
166–176; my quotes are from the Engelish translation: (Ricoeur 1996)
6 Ricoeur, o.c., 192.
7 (Sandel 1996). Judgemental Toleration ‘assesses the moral worth or permissibility of the practice at issue,
and permits or restricts it according to the weight of these moral considerations in relation to competing moral
and practical considerations.’(107) In the examples he gives it is clear that the toleration of some ‘evil’ is
desirable when a greater good is made possible or a greater evil is avoided by its permission. See for a similar
viewpoint my ‘Why Tolerance cannot be our Principal Value’, in: Bijdragen. International Journal in
Philosophy and Theology 71/4, 2010, 377–390.
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many basic freedoms, to start with, the freedom of religion. The peak of the virtue
Ricoeur calls tolerance is reached in stage four. Here tolerance starts losing its simul-
taneously passive and polemical character, because I now try to overcome the disjunc-
tion between truth and justice by allowing my own truth to be doubted and—face to
face with the other’s convictions—to suspend the question of truth. Tolerance thus here
not only affects the tendency to compel or coerce, but also the truth itself; I now stand
open to the possibility that (political or religious) truth may exist elsewhere.
The most intriguing question raised by Ricoeur’s tolerance curve is however the fact
that he also discerns a fifth stage, one where the curve starts displaying a downward
trend. The demanding ‘ascetic’ curiosity with regard to the truth of the other has now
changed over into a comfortable and self-sufficient vive la différence, delimited only by
the harm principle. Here, I ‘approve of all ways of life, as long as they do not manifestly
harm, third parties’.8 We can say that tolerance in this stage loses its ‘ascetic’ character
and in a certain sense becomes superfluous as a virtue.
This is the more recent incarnation—one reaching its climax in especially the
Western Europe of the past few decades—of a tolerance which had become superfluous
due to the fact that religious and even moral truths have become utterly subjective,
relegated to strictly private matters. Freedom of opinion, to Spinoza still a means of
furthering the public cause as we saw, and bespeaking of faithfulness to God,9 now
turns into the freedom to express any arbitrary inner—and therefore per definition
‘authentic’—upwelling or message.
In a recent essay on tolerance, the great Italian writer ClaudioMagris gives an account of
a trip to the Netherlands in 1988. During his trip, he attended a festival where, for all
practical purposes, a boundless, permissive tolerance seemed to hold sway:
‘Innumerable stands, stalls, booths and tents, all cheek by jowl, presenting, propa-
gating, preaching and disseminating their gospels and diverse high roads to salvation.
Political parties, churches, societies, clubs, streamings and groupings all displaying
their different and often totally contradictory recipes for spiritual, physical, social,
metaphysical, sexual, cultural or gastronomic salvation; each had something to say
and a message to proclaim: anti-militarists, veterans, and health apostles next to
adherents of culinary diets or erotic techniques, esoteric cults or gymnastic exercises,
ascetic or orgiastic practices; advocates of collectivization next to representatives of a
wild-anarchic individualism (Magris 2013).’
Magris’ description of the Dutch festival comes close to what Ricoeur has in mind in
his stage five. From his phrasings it is clear that also to Ricoeur this remarkable
transition from stage four to the apotheosis of stage five raises the most questions.
Does not tolerance already exceed a critical threshold in stage four, causing it to change
over into something different to the virtue of tolerance? Does not perhaps a secret
kinship and complicity exist between the attitudes of the last two stages? After all, ‘(…)
nothing resembles more the sentence BThere is also truth other than with me^, than the
sentence: BDifferences are indifferent^’.10 This sliding into indifference is responsible
8 Ricoeur, o.c., 191.
9 Spinoza,o.c. 259: ‘And if we, in conclusion, would also give consideration to this, that the loyalty of the
individual to the public cause and God alike could only be known from his works, namely the love of his
neighbour, we would have no doubt that the best form of government would permit the individual the same
freedom to philosophize which, as we have earlier demonstrated, also religion permits.’
10 Ricoeur, o.c., 197.
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for the references in the title of Ricoeur’s essay to an exhaustion or ‘Erosion’ of
tolerance, and to the need for a ‘Resistance’ by means of delimiting tolerance with
‘the Intolerable’.
Ricoeur also consciously describes the attitude of the fourth stage in the first person
singular and in a Christian theological vocabulary, that is, as a possibility of his own
Christian religion:
‘And what if, saying to myself, my conviction was not equal to the Truth (with a
capital T)? After all, I don’t have the truth; I only hope (and I remind myself here
of my master Gabriel Marcel) to be in the truth. All human understanding (I
would add in my heart) is limited, and so also that within which ineluctably
expresses my conviction. Is this not itself the destiny par excellence of a
conviction which touches the Absolute by some side? BI am who I am^, says
the God of Exodus, escaping thus the capture of literary genres in which his
relation to men let itself be inscribed: stories, legislations, prophesies, hymns,
words of wisdom, etc. And if I add that it is in a circular relation that a religious
community recognizes itself as founded in Writings of which it has in exchange
delimited the code and transmitted through the centuries the major historical
interpretations, must I not conclude that this founding word in regards to my
community is both supreme (in the sense that it is subordinated to nothing at all
that is superior in its own meaning space) and inexhaustible, in the sense that a
gap deepens between the origin of its donation and the history of its reception and
its transmission? If it is indeed as such, must I not have to admit that there is also
some truth other than for me?’11
The ascetism in question could thus according to Ricoeur only be phrased in the I-
form, more precisely: it concerns the individual ‘in the Kierkegaardian sense, in other
words, anti-Hegelian.’12 This is the rare ascetism of a few sages form the world’s
religions, and we should, suspects Ricoeur, come to terms with the enduring gap
between wisdom and citizenship of stage three. The fact that in his Phenomenology
of Spirit Hegel deals with ‘scepticism’ after ‘stoicism’ already suggests a potential
kinship: is someone who is willing to suspend his truth not already well underway
towards scepticism and indifference?
The fact that in stage five ‘the differences become indifferent’ is, according to
contemporary opponents of this type of tolerance, due to the ‘multi-culturalists’, whom
in their texts they castigate for their cultural relativism. But this cultural relativism may
have had its origins in the era of the devastating European wars of religion of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in other words, at the very beginning of the
modern history of tolerance and its philosophical representation in thinkers like
Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza.
Like Ricoeur, Stanley Fish, and even earlier Leszek Kolakowski, have put a finger
on this ‘wearing out’ or ‘erosion’ of tolerance. To say that it is preferable to tolerate the
gravest of errors rather than to risk a civil war is, according to Kolakowski, culturally
and psychologically ‘something completely different’ to saying that we should tolerate
11 Ricoeur, o.c., 194–195.
12 Ricoeur, o.c, 195.
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the most widely divergent religious convictions because differences don’t matter
anyhow. Still, according to him, this second conclusion has often been drawn, and, in
our own ‘hedonistic culture’, has in the meantime become common currency
(Kolakowski 1999).13 And Fish, in his brilliant essay on Locke’s Letter Concerning
Toleration (1689), shows that already in this text there is mention of a certain sliding of
religious tolerance towards the trivialization of the religious:
‘If you say that religious belief is not something you should be rewarded or
penalized for, and certainly not something you should fight about, it is only a short
step to saying (what many came to say) that it is not worth fighting about. There is a
very fine line, and sometimes no line at all, between removing religion from the public
battlefield (as Locke proposed, TdW) and retiring it to the sidelines, where it is
displayed only on ceremonial occasions marked by the pomp and circumstance we
often accord to something we have trivialized.’14
In the end the religious person is expected to view his religion as ‘either something
he must keep to himself or something he must offer with a diffidence that might
characterize his offer of canapés at a cocktail party.’15
During the last few decades we in Europe have indeed become accustomed to regard
religion and religious identity as the inalienable private choice and self-creation of the
individual; even institutional religion’s traditional frameworks—such as churches and
the passing down of doctrine—we now quickly tend to associate with the curtailment of
freedom and intolerance.16 Even to the most enthusiastic believer, Marcel Gauchet
writes with regard to France in his book La religion dans la Démocratie (1998), the
whole idea of a nexus between our political order and religion has become an
inconceivable, if not often blasphemous, thought (Gauchet 1998). The privatization
of religion has now reached its completion.
From Omnipresent to Polemical Tolerance: The Case of the Netherlands
Well now, the privatization of religion, culture and even morality could provide the
basis for two completely different forms of social practice. One could hold that
religious and cultural identities have an a priori right to be left in peace, to be
‘respected’ (putting it in grander terms), because, like it or not, they are expressions
of self-determination. This - in the name of the virtue of tolerance—has generated a
new form of hypocrisy, the culture of ‘political correctness’. Negative judgement
regarding the deviant culture or religion of the other then not only becomes superfluous
(religion is no longer an object of tolerance in a state where religious freedom exists),
but soon after undesirable (it threatens to disrupt social cohesion—it is even considered
a form of ‘discrimination’ in a number of European countries).
Multiculturalism then boils down to a cult of contact-shunning, of an enforced
silence amongst various subcultures and population groups. And indeed: once my
religion or culture has become my very personal creation or design, then nothing needs
to be ‘ascetically’ tolerated anymore, for nothing is being shared or strives towards
13 (Kolakowski 1999); see also (Kolakowski 1982)
14 Fish, o.c., 175.
15 Fish, o.c., 59.
16 See Jonkers (2002).
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public recognition, and thus nothing risks raising contradictions or irritation any longer.
One could also say that a single notion regarding the status of religion, culture and even
political conviction has gained complete dominance: these are mere means to self-
realization, personal hobbies even. The notion that we are primarily concerned with our
own ‘self-realization’ and self-expression, then has become so prevalent that we are
hardly able to conceive of commitments to political or ethical ideals or faithfulness to a
religious conviction as anything but loincloths covering up emotional needs, peculiar-
ities of character or private ambition. Hence the media’s untiring hunt for ‘the man
behind the politician’.
But this form of tolerance could just as well generate an utterly polemical
form of intolerance. The surprising step from ultra-tolerance to intolerance was
put into words by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann as follows. The
demand to respect other convictions, he writes, ‘then changes over into the
demand to have no convictions, on the basis of which one then holds opposing
views as incorrect (Spaemann 2002).’ Tolerance itself now becomes indicative
of a political line separating an ‘us’, the tolerant part of the world, from a
‘them’, the bearers of worn-out, backward and intolerant traditions. Claudio
Magris formulates the transition from a tolerance-become-absolute to intolerance
even sharper: ‘The statement ascribed to Voltaire, that he was prepared to rise
in mortal defence of his worst enemy’s right to free expression, finds its ironic
historical counterpart in those who are so passionately tolerant, that they are
prepared to put all intolerant people up against the wall.’ 17
In the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, a tolerance turned polemical has
precipitated an outcome which is the complete opposite of political correctness. The
expression of authentic personal feelings, judgements and prejudices has become
sacrosanct, and any discussion concerning boundaries is dismissed as an invasion of
freedom or act of moralizing. Ian Buruma, author of an illuminating book on the recent
political and social turbulence in the Netherlands, rightly perceives a certain kinship
between the unrestrained verbal self-expression of the murdered Dutch film director
and Islam critic, Theo van Gogh, and the devoutness of the Dutch pietistic tradition,
where inner feelings are imbued with a sheen of holiness, and considered superior to all
external cultures and cults—which, as we have seen, Carl Schmitt sees already starting
with Hobbes:
‘The insistence on total frankness, the idea that tact is a form of hypocrisy,
and that everything, no matter how sensitive, should be stated openly, with no
holds barred, the elevation of bluntness to a kind of moral ideal: this wilful
lack of delicacy is a common trait in Dutch behaviour. Perhaps its roots are in
Protestant pietism, a reaction to what was seen as glib Catholic hypocrisy.
Private confession had to become public. Discretion was a sign of holding
back the truth, of dishonesty (Buruma 2007).’
Ian Buruma was also right, when he discerned a like-mindedness between van Gogh
and the editorship of Charlie Hebdo who were assassinated by terrorists in Paris in
January 2015 (Buruma 2015). So the absolute tolerance has triggered the heinous
practices of religious gangsters.
17 Magris, o.c. 10.
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III Fundamentalism as Remedy: Isaac Bashevis Singer’s The Penitent
By means of a somewhat different route also Robert Spaemann lands up at the issue of
subjectivism as suspension of tolerance, and that of ‘fundamentalism’ as extreme but
modern response to it. When Ricoeur, as we have seen, at the peak of his curve
acknowledges the ‘circular’—and therefore contestable—nature of the link between
his religious community and her foundation in Holy Scripture, he is in fact pointing out
the well-known problem of the hermeneutic circle. Spaemann does the same in an
essay on the modern phenomenon of fundamentalism. As is well known, in its initial
phase Protestantism returned to Scripture out of the conviction that the stream emanat-
ing from the source (tradition) had insufficient authority, and the institution of inter-
pretation binding tradition to the source (the Church) had become incompetent and
perverted. ‘Das Wort sie sollen lassen stahn’, wrote Luther in defence of the letter of
the text, against dogmatic appropriations, and in order to curtail free investigations of
Scripture by the solitary individual. Which of course did not allow him to escape the
hermeneutic circle either. For even if the text is the final criterion, the text is always
given to us as interpreted text, for the act of reading is already one of interpretation.
Well now, argues Spaemann, an element of the abyss lurks in this hermeneutic circle,
for it ‘seems to open the door to arbitrariness, and to make everything, including
atheism, compatible with the Bible (Spaemann 1989).’ (Protestant) fundamentalism
which wants to interpret Scripture literally, then becomes a kind of self-deception in
order not to face the real problem—hermeneutic subjectivism, arbitrariness -, while the
Catholic church’s answer to the problem has been to establish a formal monopoly on
interpretation.
Mildly put, historically seen neither solution has been without its problems, and one
should probably conclude that in both instances the arbitrary moment in the herme-
neutic circle had merely shifted. Even today still, expressions of solo investigations into
Scripture by believers and theologians alike regularly sees the Catholic church feeling
itself forced to react with repressive measures, and the discrepancy between lip-service
to Rome’s religious truth and actual practice (in short: hypocrisy) has to many become
synonymous with the adjective ‘catholic’. In Protestant churches on the other hand,
orthodoxy has always enjoyed a rather precarious status, and subjectivistic
enrapturement and fundamentalism have been recurring problems. Of the fact that
subjectivistic relativism and ultra-orthodoxy call forth and hold one another in a grip,
the Jewish novelist Isaac Bashevis Singer (1904–1991) gives a literary account in The
Penitent (1983), the novel which first clarified to me the central impulse in the psycho-
moral genesis of the spiritual attitude we nowadays refer to as fundamentalism.
The Penitant is a first person account of the life of Joseph Shapiro, a Polish Jew who
witnessed the German bombing of Warsaw in 1939, survived the war, and in 1947
emigrated to the United States with his girlfriend. Told retrospectively, Shapiro’s story
is of the deep personal and existential crisis he suffers in his adoptive country, and of
his radical decision to start a new life in an ultra-orthodox Jewish community in Israel.
He describes his growing repugnance with his life in a left-liberal environment under
modern and late-capitalist conditions. I summarize a number of elements from his
description.
As a dealer in real estate he made big money, yet at the same time became
increasingly haunted by the thought that by itself, making money was utterly
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meaningless. In his own circle, adultery was regarded as a supreme virtue. Conjugal
fidelity was tantamount to ‘constantly eating the same dish’, held his friends (Singer
1986). Also he and his wife—the marriage remained childless—both take lovers. But a
man living with different women quickly becomes an expert in telling lies, and the fact
that one of his mistresses was starting to clean him out financially, left him feeling that
her love had been bought. They frequently visit the theatre and films in which
obscenities, extreme violence, scheming and deceit are portrayed as the most normal
things on earth. They read highly fashionable authors and Western thinkers, but he
often caught himself wondering whether they actually had anything to say. Often the
authors’ message would simply read: we live in an abattoir, and there’s nothing to be
done about it. And the labour of Western philosophers would essentially seem to boil
down to saying that with regard to what really matters, we know nothing, and can know
nothing.
The American legal system left him with the impression that paying bribes to police
and judges was quite commonplace, just as it was for the legal profession to ensure
murderers and rapists remain out of prison. Disrespect of the elderly was considered
normal; this was the reason why everyone was colouring their hair, having nose jobs or
make-overs, why he heard elderly people saying they were ‘80 years young’. Many
turned to therapy, and especially psycho-analytic therapy always seemed to have the
same answer: it is someone else’s fault. Your mother was too dominant, while your
father on the other hand was too often absent or too insensitive. However, in the circles
in which he moved, to criticise such practices was regarded as meddling in the affairs of
others, simply not done. In the meantime, his leftist friends and acquaintances had
posters of Lenin and Stalin on their walls, and were dreaming of a communist
revolution and the wrath of the masses. To him, reading the paper felt like swallowing
a daily dose of poison: war, murder, rape and deceit.
Also the structural cruelty towards animals he found increasingly difficult to stom-
ach. The thought that ‘where animals are concerned, we are all Nazis’, took root in him.
In my opinion, this is the key sentence in the novel, for the thought of ultimately not
being far removed from the Nazis, completes his crisis. ‘My whole being was one skein
of bitterness, sourness and shame over my own degradation.’18 ‘Run from the culture of
Hitler and Stalin!’, Shapiro concluded: I must return to my Jewish roots.19 From this
moment on, he felt ‘like a beast (running) from a forest fire’.20 The key term here is
separation from all ‘worldliness’: worldly clothing, worldly women, worldly idols.
After much hesitation and self-doubt (wasn’t he merely being the victim of some new
form of self-deception?) he makes a radical break with his life in the United States, with
his wife, his mistress, his friends and his work, and he gets on a plane to join an ultra-
orthodox Jewish group in Israel. ‘I let my beard and hair grow, donned an upper
garment, and broke completely with all things associated with modern Judaism’. Here
any compromise must be strongly rejected, for assimilation is adaptation, and adapta-
tion opens the way to Nazism and therefore a radical unfaithfulness towards his
ancestors.
18 Singer, o.c. 27.
19 Singer, o.c., 50.
20 Singer, o.c., 85.
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Faithfulness and unfaithfulness is indeed the central and completely binary opposi-
tion in this account of conversion, for the ‘separation’ which it necessitates is in service
of a representation of integrity and purity, as represented by the ancestors. Conversion
to a Jewish-orthodox way of life here takes the form of a break with ingratitude. This
ingratitude Shapiro experiences in such a profound way that he associates it with the
practices of his parents’ henchmen.
Of course it is possible to dismiss this very dark sketch of 1970’s American society
and Shapiro’s environment as a gnostic caricature. And the opinions of recent converts
(irrespective of to or from a religion) should naturally be taken with a pinch of salt. But
by leaving it at that we would probably be missing the disquieting and ‘dangerous’
aspect of this novel. In their study Occidentalism Avishai Margalit and Ian Buruma
give many examples of the birth of fundamentalism (and terrorism) out of a ‘romantic’
aversion against modern life and modern culture, and this as well within the West itself
as by non-western people who were living for a period in a western country, as for
example Sayyid Qutb, born in Egypt, who lived for e period in New York; out of his
disgust of this city was born one of the most influential Islamist thinkers of the
twentieth century (Buruma and Margalit 2004).
Gratitude and faithfulness, as well as their opposites, refer to attitudes
regarding our parents and other ancestors, to their legacy. But hidden under-
neath the often ostentatious posing of religious fundamentalism lies the question
of how traditions could come to accept change, even understand it as progress.
This would necessitate a hermeneutic labour of developing criteria both for
safeguarding continuity with the origin and with tradition, as well as to
distinguish improvements from things which are likely to detract.21
During the past decade the need for this has been dramatically evident with regard to
Muslim immigrants in Europe. Let me give an example here. A while back in France,
the European Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan proposed a moratorium on the
practices of corporal punishment prescribed in Sharia law with regard to certain
‘offences against God’ (Roy 2005). For this he was severely criticized by French
secularists, who saw in this proof of his hypocrisy and his ‘forked tongue’. After all,
Ramadan did not propose simply abolishing these practices altogether, and his alle-
giance to the French Republic could therefore be considered only half-hearted and
ambiguous. Unjustly so, argues the Islam scholar Olivier Roy, for with this Ramadan in
fact gave theological recognition to the secular state and its monopoly on penal
practice, while at the same time introducing a kind of Islamic purgatory. This is in fact
the kind of much-needed hermeneutic labour required to make it possible for a Muslim
citizen to be part of a secular state.
IV The Testing of the Democratic Separation Between Truth and Justice
in Our Time
Gratitude and faithfulness, as well as the hermeneutic circle or the unfaithful element
woven into all faithful practices, is not a problem which only concerns Muslims. In a
country like the Netherlands, the prevailing political tendency of taking the most recent
21 Spaemann, o.c. 47.
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liberal consensus as unshakable point of departure with regard to the integration of
immigrants, in fact testifies to a repression of our own—in part religiously coloured—
history. A Dutch politician already pointed this out in 2006, when he wrote that, while a
politicised Islam in the Netherlands could indeed prove troublesome, he at the same
time had the strong impression that, conversely, the Dutch were busy ‘turning (their)
political consensus into a religion’. One of the examples he gave concerned the official
Dutch naturalization film shown abroad to potential immigrants: ‘The film suggests
that, as a Muslim, one would have to accept things like Amsterdam’s Gay Parade and
the likelihood of encountering topless girls on beaches. Should this indeed be the
condition for being a Dutch citizen, then we might as well—retro-actively—deny it to
our own parents. For what they in their day rejected, is of course precisely that which
now has to be tolerated (Wöltgens 2006).’ In other words, a recent, contingent liberal
opinion here becomes fixed as norm and truth, as component of the national identity. In
2013, a Dutch Social-Democrat minister made known that he considered not only
enforcing obedience to Dutch laws, but also the ‘internalization’ of Dutch morality—
and thus for example also a ‘positive attitude’ towards homosexuality—as duties of
government.22 This marks a step in the direction of a new truth-regime, one which does
not accept the disjunction between truth and majority decisions; however, undoubtedly
also this time the net result would largely be hypocrisy.
Another example of this tendency towards establishing truth-regimes was given in
2006 by a specialist on Turkey, E.J. Zürcher, in connection with Turkey’s potential
entry into the European Union—a topic of considerable importance not only to Europe,
but also in geopolitical terms. He pointed out a remarkable paradox: to the very extent
that European politicians tend to outright dismiss the prospect of Turkish membership,
their own societies are starting to resemble that of Turkey. Not 10 years ago, he
established, Turkey was reproached for being insufficiently democratic, insufficiently
secular, and overly nationalistic—besides for refusing the blessings of a multi-cultural
society, and for oppressing its ethnic minorities. For in Turkey, of everyone it was
expected to repeat after Atatürk: ‘fortunate is he who can say: BI am a Turk^’.
However, in the Netherlands of today the ideal of the multi-cultural society has
already been laid to rest by all major political parties. National sovereignty is again
being played out polemically against Europe, and formulating a national identity which
could be held up to newcomers is—as we have already seen—regarded as an urgent
task by many. Meanwhile most of the Dutch population has become willing to
unquestioningly sacrifice liberal freedoms on the altar of the fight against terrorism
(Zürcher 2006).
Most spectacular is the symmetrical stalemate reached with regard to the question of
Turkey’s official recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide. While France has
recently adopted a law making denial of the 1915 genocide a criminal offence,
Turkey knows a much older law with which to gag those holding deviant opinions
(like for instance acknowledgment of the 1915 genocide). This affects the essence of
tolerance as an institutional characteristic of liberal democracy, the disjunction between
truth and justice given in the third stage of Ricoeur’s tolerance curve. Here we need to
take heed of what Charles Taylor calls ‘state neutrality’. This entails ‘avoid(ing)
favouring or disfavouring not just religious positions but any basis position, religious
22 For my critical response see: (de Wit 2013).
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or non-religious (Taylor 2011).’ And the democratic state should also refrain from
laying down its own version of historical truth.
Conclusion: Existential Versus Political Fundamentalism
I end with a conclusion regarding fundamentalism and the threat it poses to the
institutional tolerance of liberal democracy. In his essay on (Christian and Muslim)
fundamentalism, Robert Spaemann advances the thesis that the ‘dangerousness’ of a
religion or life conviction ‘is nothing but the obverse of the gravity’ these hold to their
adherents.23 As I have previously argued, I tend to agree with Spaemann on this, and
even think that it holds true for those who have elevated ‘tolerance’ to a supreme value:
then also this virtue of restraint and openness could become ‘dangerous’, even violent.
In both instances, a certain putting into perspective of this gravity is required to prevent
them from assuming their grimmer forms. Only greater self-consciousness could for
instance grant Muslims and Islamic peoples the creativity required in their future
grappling with the hermeneutic circle, and the equanimity to bear the narcissistic
wounding given with any passionate quest for truth in modern democracies. After
all, democracy by definition demands a restriction or ‘circumcision’ of our ‘truths’, in
as far as they are always qualified by democratic majorities, able to promulgate and
change laws.
In the foregoing I further suggested that the danger of fundamentalism also lurks in
the tendency—undeniably present in Europe—to fight fanaticism fanatically, in other
words, by introducing elements of an authoritarian truth-regime to democracy. Then, as
of old, it turns into a clash of opposing fanaticisms. In contrast to the so-called
hermeneutic civil wars of sixteenth and seventeenth Europe, the battle lines are now
not drawn between opposing religions, but rather between religious and non-religious
or anti-religious parties – as was demonstrated by the Danish cartoon incident and,
more recently, by the attacks at the beginning of 2015 on Charlie Hebdo and on the
cultural centre in Copenhagen where freedom of opinion in a secular state was the topic
of the discussion. Public debate regarding both the place of Islam in Europe and
religiously-founded terrorism does indeed frequently threaten to sink into a debate
essentially on religious belief versus (enlightened) atheism. In the one corner in extremo
believers, who, along with Dostoyevsky (and Joseph Shapiro)24 affirm that ‘if God does
not exist, everything is permitted’, and in the other, certain non-believers maintaining
that ‘precisely should God exist, everything would be permissible’.
But we must reject this opposition. I would even state that only by acknowledging
the aspect of truth in both statements and by taking as its point of departure the
normative principle held in common by both positions (‘not everything should be
permitted’), does a pluralistic democratic society become a real possibility. In order to
affirm this aspect of truth in Dostoyevsky’s statement, a non-polemical definition of the
term fundamentalism is required, as for instance that proposed by Spaemann and in
Singer’s novel. A fundamentalist in this sense would be ‘someone to whom something
23 Spaemann, o.c. 47.
24 Singer, o.c., 117: ‘There’s no such thing as morality without religion. If you don’t serve one idol, you serve
another.’
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is sacred, to the extent that he is unwilling to put it up for discussion.’ Departing from
this definition, each and every normal person would be a fundamentalist, for someone
to whom nothing is sacred is capable of anything. ‘God’ in Dostoyevsky’s statement
then signifies the sacred which enables co-existence, while the interpretations of it are
bound to forever remain subject to and broken by democratic decisions. Spaemann
calls this an existential fundamentalism, in distinction to a political fundamentalism
which he analyses as a form of totalitarianism for its making absolute the political
perspective: its judging of each and every aspect of life according to its positive or
negative functionality to the state.25
But the atheist also has a point. To the terrorist executing ‘God’s will’ (sometimes
not excluding acts of summary execution as we experience today, for example by ISIS
or Boko Haram), the pretence of having a hotline to God (or a secular substitute, like
communism’s ‘historic necessity’) of course justifies sweeping aside all ‘mere human’
scruples and considerations. Against this, Slavoj Žižek defends the dignity of atheism,
which has to make do without the will of God and the promise of divine reckoning. His
example is however drawn from the Christian universe. At the time of Louis IX’s
crusades, the chronicler Yves le Breton reported of an encounter with an old woman
carrying a bowl of fire in her left hand and one of water in her right. When asked why
she was carrying the bowls, she replied that with the left she wanted to set paradise
ablaze, and with the right, extinguish the flames of hell. For, she added, ‘I do not want
anyone to do good on account of promise of paradise or the fear of hell, but solely for
the love of God’. Nowadays, adds Žižek, it would seem that ‘this authentically
Christian ethical position has survived mainly within atheism’.26
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